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ZAHN-THE FREEZE ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION
In Zahn v. International Paper Co.,1 the Supreme Court held that
"[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b) (3) class action must satisfy the juris-
dictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed
from the case."'2 The decision clearly will reduce the number of class
actions brought under Rule 23(b) (3)2 The true significance of the
case, however, lies in its impact on the law of federal jurisdiction
in general.
This Note will examine that impact. Specifically, it will analyze
the effect of Zahn on the law of federal jurisdiction in cases involving
general federal questions, multiple claims, ancillary claims, and cases
involving removal from state to federal court.
I. BACKGROUND TO Zahn
To bring an action in federal court, the statutory prerequisites to fed-
eral jurisdiction must be satisfied. If jurisdiction is based on a general
federal question' or diversity of citizenship,' the jurisdictional statutes
1. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). Petitioners alleged that International Paper Company
had polluted Lake Champlain, and sought damages on behalf of themselves and other
named and unnamed lakefront property owners. Petitioners' motion for certification of
the action as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action was denied, 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971),
and on interlocutory appeal the denial was affirmed by a divided court of appeals. Zahn
v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court affirmed.
414 U.S. 291 (1973).
2. 414 U.S. at 301.
3. Fan. R. Cv. P. 23 is quoted in note 12 infra. A second recent Supreme Court
decision, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), will also reduce the number
of Rule 23(b) (3) class actions. In Eisen, the Court held that plaintiffs were required to
bear the cost of giving "'individual notice to all class members who can be identified
through reasonable effort."' Id. at 173, quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c) (2). This cost, as
a practical matter, may prevent many plaintiffs from maintaining a class action.
4. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 15 (2d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]:
[T]he rule is well stated that the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a
federal court must demonstrate that the case is within the competence of such
a court ....
[ .. TIhe parties cannot confer on a federal court jurisdiction that has not
been vested in the court by the Constitution and Congress.
See notes 65 & 66 infra; cf. Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, ex-
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require that the "matter in controversary" exceed $10,000. Tradi-
tionally, multiple parties presenting related claims have been permitted
to aggregate the amounts of their claims to meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement only when the claims involved interests that were
"common and undivided" rather than "separate and distinct. ' 8
Given federal subject matter jurisdiction, Rule 23, as a rule of pro-
cedure, can do no more than define the factual circumstances in which
a class action may be maintained. 9 The Rule was formerly thought
to distinguish between true, hybrid, and spurious class actions.10 Ag-
clusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens
or subjects thereof are additional parties.
7. Both the federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), and
the diversity jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), use the statutory language
"matter in controversy." See statutes quoted in notes 5 & 6 supra.
8. See, e.g., Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 447 (1942); Clark v. Paul Gray,
Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 (1916); Troy v. G.A.
Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1911); Woodside v. Beckman, 216 U.S. 117, 120-
21 (1910); Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302, 328 (1902); Wheless v. St. Louis, 180
U.S. 379, 382 (1901); Clay v. Field, 138 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1891); Bernards Township
v. Stebbins, 109 U.S. 341, 356 (1883); Ex parte Baltimore & O.R.R., 106 U.S. 5, 6
(1882); Russell v. Stansell, 105 U.S. 303, 304 (1881); Shields v. Thomas, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 5-6 (1854). But see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 241-42
(1936).
9. See FiD. R. Civ. P. 82: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit
the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 308 U.S. 689 (1939):
(a) Representation. If persons constiuting a class are so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or
more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf
of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced
for or against the class is
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby
becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting
the several rights and a common relief is sought
The categories became known as "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" after being so
labeled by Professor Moore. J. MooRE & I. FREmAN, 2 MooR' s FEDERAL PRAcmcn §
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gregation of claims was permitted only in true class actions. Because
hybrid and spurious class actions were held not to involve "common
and undivided interests," aggregation was not permitted.'1
Although Rule 23 was completely rewritten in 1966,12 the Supreme
2304 (1938). (Pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1934, Ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, the
Federal Rules took effect upon the close of the 75th Cong., 3d Sess., on June 30, 1938.)
I1. See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc. 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939); Steele v. Guaranty
Trust, 164 F.2d 387, 388 (2d Cir. 1947).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 provides in part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are ques-
tions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct
for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gen-
erally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interests of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of
any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against
members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely
to be encountered in the management of a class action.
The Advisory Committee gave several reasons for the revision of the 1938 version of
the rule, quoted in note 10 supra. Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Commit-
tee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98-107 (1966). First, the categories of the old rule proved
"obscure and uncertain." Id. at 98. Second, the old rule did not "provide an adequate
guide to the proper extent of the judgments in class actions." Id. Third, the advantages
initially sought by means of the "spurious" class action were not always obtained. Id.
Furthermore, "the original rule did not squarely address itself to the question of the
measures that might be taken during the course of the action to insure procedural
fairness." Id. at 99.
For analysis of Rule 23, as amended, see 7 C. Wnirjrr & A. MH.LER, FEDERAL
PRAcTicE AND PRocEDuRE § 1753 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WaiGHr & MuLER];
Cohen, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1213-28 (1966);
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Court, in Snyder v. Harris,'13 found the "common and undivided" and
"separate and distinct' standards still controlling for class actions. None
of the Snyder class members, named or unnamed, who had separate
and distinct claims, individually satisfied the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement. Reasoning that the aggregation rule was derived from the
statutory phrase "matter in controversy," and that changes in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could not modify the jurisdictional
statute, 4 -the Court concluded that the federal courts lacked jurisdic-
tion over the case.
1-. THE Zahn DECISION
In Zahn, plaintiffs brought a Rule 23(b) (3) class action alleging
damage to their land as a result of defendant's water pollution. Federal
jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, and all of the named
class members presented individual claims in excess of $10,000. The
district court found, ",to a legal certainty," however, that some of the
unnamed class members' damages could not exceed $10,000,15 and
also determined that no appropriate class could be identified.' Relying
on this determination and the Snyder holding, the district court ordered
the class action allegation stricken. A divided court of appeals upheld
the district court's order.17
The Supreme Court affirmed, relying exclusively on Snyder and the
traditional standard governing aggregation. The Court found that
the aggregation standard for multiple plaintiffs asserting separate and
distinct claims
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39
(1967); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HAIv. L. RFv. 356, 375-400 (1967).
13. 394U.S. 332 (1969).
14. Id. at 336-37. The Court refused to overrule its previous interpretation of
"matter in controversy." The Court reasoned that when the jurisdictional statutes were
amended in 1958, Congress intended to acquiesce to the judicial interpretation of "matter
in controversy" and, therefore, the aggregation rule was not merely judge-made, but
statutory. Id. at 338-39. Moreover, the Court concluded that to change the aggregation
rule would run counter to the congressional intent to reduce the federal courts' caseload,
particularly with regard to diversity jurisdiction, which Congress had expressed in 1958
by increasing the jurisdictional amount from $3,000 to $10,000, Act of July 25, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415, as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969).
15. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971).
16. Id. at 433.
17. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 1975:447
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mandates not only . . . that the entire case must be dismissed where
none of the plaintiffs claims are more than $10,000 but also requires
that any plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed
from the case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient
claims. 18
Citing the Snyder holding that the rewriting of Rule 23 had not changed
the standards for aggregation, the Court approved the district court's
order dismissing from the case those plaintiffs unable to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount requirement.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that ancillary jurisdiction pro-
vided a basis for federal jurisdiction over the dismissed plaintiffs'
claims. 19 He reasoned that ancillary jurisdiction was appropriate for
class actions under Rule 23(b) (3) because, although extending juris-
diction would cause some increase in the workload of the federal
courts, "a denial of ancillary jurisdiction [would] impose a much larger
burden on the state and federal judiciary as a whole"2 and would
create numerous practical difficulties.2 ' In light of this dissent 2  and
the therebefore apparent availability of ancillary jurisdiction,23 the
Court's opinion may be regarded as implicitly holding that ancillary
18. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973). Since the plaintiffs'
claims were separate and distinct, aggregation of their individual claims was not
permitted. As a result, many of the unnamed plaintiffs did not have claims in excess of
$10,000 and therefore were not parties to any claim that satisfied the statutory require-
ments. Thus, the federal court had no jurisdiction over these plaintiffs and dismissal was
required. As recognized by the Zahn dissent, implicit in this analysis was a rejection of
the applicability of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine.
19. Id. at 305-07.
20. Id. at 308.
21. Id. at 311-12. Justice Brennan noted that the district court would have to
identify the class members whose claims exceeded $10,000 and reasoned that "few, if any
Rule 23(b)(3) classes will lend themselves to a determination, on the basis of the
pleadings, that each proposed member meets that [jurisdictional amount] requirement"
Id. at 312. In the future, it may be necessary for unnamed plaintiffs to intervene in order
to show that they meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
22. The dissenting opinion in the court of appeals decision also argued that ancillary
jurisdiction provided a basis for hearing the claims that lacked the jurisdictional amount.
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036-40 (2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers, I.,
dissenting).
23. The ancillary jurisdiction issue was briefed and argued before the Court, 42
U.S.L.W. 3234 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1973). Snyder had previously held that the aggregation
standard still controlled for class actions, and the articulated Zahn holding was no more
than a corollary to that ruling. The Court's reluctance to discuss the ancillary jurisdiction
question was more surprising than the explicit holding of the case.
451
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jurisdiction did not extend to the claims of the unnamed plaintiffs in
the Zahn case.24
The Zahn decision creates no conceptual problems in determining
federal jurisdiction in Rule 23(b) (3) class actions brought under
diversity jurisdiction. While federal courts may encounter procedural
problems in following the Zahn requirement, 5 the standard for deter-
24. The majority opinion never directly discussed ancillary jurisdiction. Its sole
comment on the issue was a quotation from the court of appeals decision: "[O]ne
plaintiff may not ride in on another's coattails." 414 U.S. at 301, quoting Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 1972). While this may keep the
rejection of ancillary jurisdiction from being a sub silentio holding, the statement
presents only a conclusion that ancillary jurisdiction is not available, without providing
any reasons for that conclusion.
25. Procedural problems arise in determining which class members have federally
cognizable claims and whether the class action may be maintained. Prior to making these
decisions, a trial judge can and should presume that the class action is proper. Cox v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972); City of Inglewood v. City of Los
Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1971); Cusick v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie
Voor Chemische Industrie, 317 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1970); cf. Yaffe v.
Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972) (discovery permitted before final class action
determination made); Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(preliminary hearing to determine class action status not required to permit discovery
prior to final class action determination); Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, 53
F.R.D. 647, 651 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("For the purpose of preventing and correcting
abuses, once an action is filed as a class action it should be so presumed even prior to a
formal determination that it is a class action"); Philadelphia Housing Authority v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
modified and af'd on other grounds sub nom., Ace Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Crane
Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971) (final class action determination unnecessary before
settlement negotiations are undertaken).
Once class action status is presumed, the trial judge must determine whether the claims
of the class members are "separate and distinct" or "common and undivided." See note
51 infra. If the claims are found to be "common and undivided," then Zahn will not
apply and aggregation will be permitted. If the claims are found to be "separate and
distinct," however, then the amount in controversy for each and every class member's
claim must be determined.
Regardless of whether aggregation is permitted, the amount in controversy is measured
at the time the complaint is filed. WIorr 111.
The plaintiff is required to allege a claim that satisfies the jurisdictional amount
requirement, and, if challenged, has the burden of proving the amount of the claim.
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); cf. Rossin v.
Southern Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707, 712 (10th Cir. 1973); Poindexter v. Teubert,
462 F.2d 1096, 1097 (4th Cir. 1972) (plaintiff has burden of proof to show class action
is maintainable and meets prerequisites of Rule 23). It has been stated, however, that,
"... the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good
faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal." St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.,
303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938). While these tests have been treated as a single require-
ment, Jones v. Landry, 387 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1967), that analysis may be
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/6
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mining federal jurisdiction is now quite clear--each and every class
member, named or unnamed, must present a claim in excess of $10,000
unless the claims are "common and undivided." Difficulties arise, how-
ever, when the Zahn decision is applied to cases having different pro-
cedural postures.
inaccurate. For class actions, two requirements exist. They are functions of the two
problems that arise in evaluating the jurisdictional amount allegation for such actions.
First, representative plaintiffs must allege an amount in controversy for other individu-
als, raising the question of what effort representative plaintiffs must make to determine
in good faith the amount of unnamed class members' claims. While the imposition of a
substantive standard would seem undesirable because it would focus on the representative
plaintiffs' efforts rather than the amounts involved, the rejection of a substantive
standard raises the second problem.
Trial judges must assess the claims of individuals not actively involved in the litigation.
This raises the question of what action may be required of unnamed class members by
trial judges assessing the amount of unnamed class members' claims. Rule 23(c) (2)
requires only that unnamed class members reply to the notice of the action if they desire
to be excluded from the class; no affirmative response is required to remain part of the
class. Some courts, however, have ordered that affirmative responses or "proof of claims"
be made by unnamed class members who received notice if they wish to remain in the
class. See, e.g., Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62, 71-72 (D.D.C. 1972); In re
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 267, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Iowa v. Union
Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 391, 403 (S.D. Iowa 1968), aff'd on other
grounds, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American
Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70, 74-75
(D. Utah 1966) (authority found in Rule 23(d)); cf. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). Contra, Wainwright v.
Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532, 535 unnumbered note (N.D. Ga. 1972). Because a simple
affirmative response may not be sufficient to provide the information needed by the trial
judge, a preliminary hearing could become necessary. See Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291, 312 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Intervention, at least for the
purpose of establishing jurisdiction, may be necessary .... "). While trial judges may
have authority under Rule 23(d) (2) to hold a preliminary hearing, requiring all class
members to participate in the hearing would defeat one major purpose of class actions,
the representation of absent claimants.
If it is determined that some of the class members satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirement, the trial judge is faced with an additional problem. Though not mentioned
in Rule 23, one of the prerequisites to the maintenance of a class action is the definition
of an ascertainable class. See Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (4th Cir. 1972);
DeBremaecher v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970); Eisman v. Pan Am. World
Airlines, 336 F. Supp. 543, 547 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Chaffee v. Johnson, 229 F. Supp. 445,
448 (S.D. Miss. 1964), af'd on other grounds, 352 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1965); Arneson v.
Raymond Lee Org., 59 F.R.D. 145, 147 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Thomas v. Clark, 54 F.R.D.
245, 248 (D. Minn. 1971). But cf. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972)
(23 (b) (2) class action; declaratory and injunctive relief sought). With the exception of
an action involving liquidated damages, defining the class in terms of damages recovera-
ble would be impractical. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D.
Vt. 1971). This does not mean, however, that an ascertainable, definite class, with all
members satisfying the jurisdictional requirements, could not exist. City of Inglewood v.
City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 1971). Courts could look to each claimWashington University Open Scholarship
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TIT. ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1331, GENERAL
FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
As the opinions in both cases indicate, Snyder and Zahn apply with
equal force to actions in which jurisdiction is based on the presence
of a general federal question or diversity of citizenship.20 This con-
clusion is obvious, for it would be illogical to construe the identical
statutory phrase "matter in controversy" differently in the two statutes.27
Noting the numerous statutory exceptions granting specific federal ques-
tion jurisdiction without imposing a jurisdictional amount require-
ment,28 both opinions discounted any significant effect of the aggrega-
tion requirement on federal question jurisdiction.
No attempt has been made to determine the number of federal ques-
tion cases in which federal jurisdiction is based solely on section
1331.20 In light of the number and scope of the statutes that do not
require a jurisdictional amount,30 it is clear that a large majority of
to determine whether it meets the jurisdictional requirements. That step, however, would
eliminate any advantage of the class action procedure over mere joinder. This advantage
is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a class action required by Rule 23(a). Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 433 (D. Vt. 1971). Instead, the court or
representative plaintiffs could devise a "measure" to define the class. This measure would
have to be a factor accurately determinable for every class member and directly related
to the measure of damages for each. It would have to refer to conditions existing at the
time the alleged injury was done, but be determinable after the litigation had com-
menced.
For example, a "measure" in the Zahn case could have been the lakefront footage of
the property owned by each class member. It may reasonably be assumed that as the
lakefront footage increased, the amount of damages increased. Plaintiffs would have had
to demonstrate only that the damages were directly related to the lakefront footage and
that some specified amount of footage corresponded to damages in excess of $10,000.
The class could then have been defined in terms of property owners having a specified
minimum lakefront footage.
26. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 302 n.11 (1973); Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).
27. This conclusion is further supported by the observation that the two statutes
were amended, Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 1, 72 Stat. 415, and re-
enacted, Act of October 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-635, § 2, 80 Stat. 880, by a single act.
28. See note 30 infra.
29. A quantitative determination of the cases that can be brought in federal court
only under section 1331 may be impossible. In cases where the amount in controversy
unquestionably exceeds $10,000, plaintiffs often allege section 1331 and disregard any
other possible grounds for jurisdiction. Thus, determining the number of cases that need
section 1331 to acquire federal jurisdiction would entail an independent examination of
each case in which section 1331 has been alleged as the jurisdictional base. See, e.g., text
accompanying notes 36-43 infra.
30. Statutes that establish federal jurisdiction without requiring a jurisdictional
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federal question cases do not need a jurisdictional amount to be
heard in federal court. Nevertheless, the existence of a general fed-
eral question statute indicates that some kinds of action must proceed
pursuant to section 1331. 11 Among these are actions under the Jones
Act,32 actions challenging the constitutionality of state statutes, 3 actions
against federal officers or challenging the constitutionality of federal
statutes, 34 and actions based on federal common law."
Professor Wright has questioned the proposition that actions brought
under the Jones Act3 6 must rely upon section 1331 to establish federal
jurisdiction.37  Another jurisdictional statute, section 1337, grants
amount include: 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) (admiralty and maritime); id. § 1334
(bankruptcy); id. § 1336 (Interstate Commerce Commission orders); id. § 1337 (com-
merce and antitrust regulations); id. § 1338 (patents, plant variety protection, copy-
rights, trademarks and unfair competition); id. § 1339 (postal matters); id. § 1340
(internal revenue-customs duties); id. § 1343 (civil rights and elective franchise); id. §
1344 (election disputes); id. § 1345 (United States as plaintiff); id. § 1346 (United
States as defendant); id. § 1347 (partition action where United States is joint tenant); id.
§ 1348 (national banking association as party in suit commenced by United States or
officer thereof); id. § 1350 (alien's action for tort committed in violation of treaty); id.
§ 1351 (consuls and vice-consuls as defendants); id. § 1352 (bonds executed under
federal law); id. § 1353 (Indian allotments); id. § 1354 (land grants from different
states); id. § 1355 (fine, penalty, or forfeiture incurred under act of Congress); id. §
1356 (seizures not within admiralty or maritime jurisdiction); id. § 1358 (eminent
domain); id. § 1361 (action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his
duty). See generally WRIGHr 108 nn.12-27.
31. If no federal question actions require § 1331, then it may be assumed that
Congress, when amending the jurisdictional amount provisions in 1958, would have
eliminated the jurisdictional amount requirement rather than raising it to $10,000. See
note 14 supra.
32. "[The only significant categories of 'Federal question' cases subject to the
jurisdictional amount are suits under the Jones Act [46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970)] and suits
contesting the constitutionality of State statutes." WRIGHT 108, quoting Sen. Rep. No.
1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 15, 22 (1958); 1958 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3103,
3112-13, 3122; see, e.g., Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280, 283 (3d Cir. 1959); Turner v.
Wilson Line, 142 F. Supp. 264 (D. Mass. 1956); Rowley v. Sierra S.S. Co., 48 F. Supp.
193 (N.D. Ohio 1942). Contra, Ballard v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 285 F. Supp.
290 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Richardson v. St. Charles-St. John the Baptist Bridge & Ferry Au-
thority, 274 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. La. 1967).
33. See Sen. Rep. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 15, 22 (1958); 1958 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3103, 3112-13, 3122.
34. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 541 (1972); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local
Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Wolf v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 16, 372
F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 342 n.2 (1969)
(Fortas, J., dissenting).
35. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-101 (1972).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 668 (1970).
37. WRiGHT 108-09.Washington University Open Scholarship
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federal courts jurisdiction "of any civil action . ..arising under any
Act of Congress regulating commerce," without regard to the amount in
controversy.18 Section 1337 has been construed to include all acts
"whose constitutional basis is the commerce clause," 9 and, in some
cases, acts for which the commerce clause is a significant though not
necessarily exclusive basis of congressional power.40  The Jones Act,
which concerns injury to seamen, 41 is arguably an act "regulating com-
merce." If so, actions under it should not be required to satisfy a
jurisdictional amount requirement.42  The absence of significant case
law supporting this conclusion may be attributed to the common practice
in personal injury actions of seeking damages in excess of $10,000;
therefore, the question whether section 1337 provides jurisdiction is
simply never presented.4"
For actions challenging the constitutionality of state statutes, section
1331 is not always necessary. Federal jurisdiction, without an amount
in controversy requirement, is granted by section 1343 (3)44 if the ac-
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or pro-
ceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting
trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies.
39. WUrHT 109, citing Felter v. Southern Pac. Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959) (Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)); Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954)
(National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943) (antitrust acts, 15 U.S.C. H9 1-33 (1970)); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38
(1939) (Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1970)); Johnson v. Butler
Bros., 162 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1947) (Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201
(1970)).
40. Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 614-15 (2d Cir.
1967).
41. The Jones Act is analogous to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §
51 (1970), which provides for recovery for injury or death to railroad employees. Since
actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act are allowed to be brought under §
1337, Imm v. Union R.R., 289 F.2d 858 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 833 (1961),
the same should be allowed for actions under the Jones Act. See WRIGHT 109; cf.
Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1967).
42. See Ballard v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 290, 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Richard v. St. Charles-St. John the Baptist Bridge & Ferry Authority, 274 F.
Supp. 764, 768-69 (E.D. La. 1967).
43. In a number of cases, plaintiffs have alleged damages in excess of the jurisdic-
tional amount, and the courts have assumed jurisdiction under section 1331 without
considering section 1337. See, e.g., Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950);
Mullen v. Fitz Simons & Connell Dredge & Dock Co., 172 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1948),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949); Branic v. Wheeling Steel Corp., 152 F.2d 887 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 801 (1945).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action author-
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tion alleges a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities granted
by the Constitution or a deprivation of equal rights provided by federal
statute.45 While section 1343(3) applies to actions alleging depriva-
tion of either personal or property rights,46 it is not available for actions
against municipal corporations, 47 the federal government, or its offi-
cers.
48
Therefore, the only major situations in which section 1331 is neces-
sary for establishing federal jurisdiction are cases challenging acts of
the federal government49 or involving federal common law."0 While
there may be other isolated cases that also require section 1331, they
are small in number. Thus, those federal question actions for which
federal jurisdiction is based solely on section 1331, and which, there-
fore, are affected by the Zahn decision, are only a small fraction of
federal question cases.
IV. AGGREGATION UNDER OTHER FEDERAL RULEs
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Nothing in the Zahn opinion limited application of its holding to
Rule 23 (b) (3) class actions, or even to class actions generally. Since
the decision construed the jurisdictional statute and not a provision of
ized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
45. Quite frequently, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) is used as the federal statute granting
the cause of action for § 1343(3) jurisdiction. Thus, the availability of federal jurisdic-
tion under § 1343(3) often turns on the scope of the cause of action provided for in 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof the dep-
rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
46. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972).
47. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
48. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963). See also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 342 n.2
(1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
49. See note 34 supra.
50. See note 35 supra.
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the federal rules, the Zahn holding should be controlling, whenever
applicable, without regard to any particular rule of procedure.
Zahn reaffirmed the traditional aggregation standard: Federal juris-
diction of a claim cannot be established solely by aggregating it with
a "separate and distincf' claim of another party. 1 Although the ex-
ception that a single plaintiff may aggregate all claims against a single
defendant52 was neither at issue in the case nor affected by it, and
although the barrier of the traditional aggregation standard may be
circumvented in certain circumstances by means of the ancillary juris-
diction doctrine,53 the aggregation requirement as applied in Zahn
reaches beyond Rule 23 (b) (3) procedures.
Rule 23(b) (1) and (b) (2) class actions are not insulated from the
Zahn holding. While aggregation will frequently be permissible in
(b) (1) actions because they often involve "common and undivided
interests," 54 it would be erroneous to presume that all (b) (1) actions
51. To apply this rule, it is necessary to distinguish "separate and distinct" claims
from "common and undivided interests." Despite the Snyder court's assurance that the
"lower courts have developed largely workable standards for determining when claims
are joint and common," 394 U.S. at 341, it does not appear to be such an easy task. See
WRIGHT 123. For cases deciding this question in various factual situations, see Annot., 3
A.L.R. FED. 372 (1970); Annot., 2A.LR. FED. 18 (1969).
Two tests have emerged. The first is the "interest in distribution" test-interests are
"common and undivided" when the opponent to the multiple claimants has no interest in
how the claim is to be divided among the claimants. See Shields v. Thomas, 58 U.S. (17
How.) 3, 4-5 (1854); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 483 F.2d 723, 725 n.2
(3d Cir. 1973); National Welfare Rights Org. v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861, 866
(D.D.C. 1974); Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), vacated as
moot, 464 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1971). Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68
COLuM. L. Rnv. 1554, 1559 (1968). The second is the "essential party" test-interests
are "common and undivided" when none of the claimants can maintain the action
without affecting the rights of other claimants. See Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d
851, 852 (3d Cir. 1945); National Welfare Rights Org. v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861,
866 (D.D.C. 1974); Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F. Supp. 945, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note,
supra, at 1559. While these two tests provide a conceptual basis for determining whether
interests are "common and undivided," no court has yet decided that one test is
controlling or that they are alternative standards. Plaintiffs, at present, are left to
examine the case law to determine whether their particular kind of claim has been
evaluated previously and, if so, to rely solely on stare decisis to settle the issue.
52. See, e.g., Crawford v. Neal, 144 U.S. 585, 593 (1892); Lemmon v. Cedar Point,
Inc., 406 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1969); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 96 (4th Cir. 1968);
Cashmere Valley Bank v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 33 F. Supp. 946, 949 (E.D. Wash.
1940).
53. See text accompanying notes 71-75 infra.
54. Class actions brought under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) must involve
adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties
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are "true" class actions. The (b) (1) classification, as distinguished
from the categories under old Rule 23,55 is based on functional criteria
and cannot automatically be equated with any particular kinds of inter-
ests or rights.56
Aggregation may also frequently be permissible in Rule 23 (b) (2)
actions.5 7 While (b) (2) actions usually arise under jurisdictional stat-
utes that contain no jurisdictional amount requirement,58 the (b) (2)
category is not limited to litigation under these jurisdictional statutes.59
Therefore, merely identifying a class action as a (b) (1) or a (b) (2)
to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(b)(1)(B). Frequently, this requirement is met in cases "when
claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims."
Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's Notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101
(1966). Actions such as these would also satisfy either of the tests for determining the
existence of "common and undivided interests.' See note 51 supra.
55. See text quoted note 10 supra.
56. Rule 23(b)(1) (A) actions need not necessarily be composed of "common and
undivided" interests. An example of a proper (b) (1) (A) class action was presented by
the advisory committee which drafted the present Rule 23: "Separate actions by
individuals against a municipality to declare a bond issue invalid or condition or limit it
... " 39 F.R.D. at 10. Actions attacking municipal bond issues have been held to
present "separate and distinct" claims. See, e.g., Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302, 328
(1902); Bernard's Township v. Stebbins, 109 U.S. 341, 356 (1883).
57. Any discussion of aggregation of claims for (b) (2) class action leads to an
inherent difficulty: The action is available only for injunctive or corresponding declara-
tory relief, not for monetary damages. This puts the trial judge in the awkward position
of evaluating the propriety of aggregating things that do not exist. The (b)(2) class
action may be viewed as an attempt to convert the stare decisis effect of a test case into
the res judicata effect of a class action. For example, in a Rule 23 (b)(2) class action
challenging the conduct of a governmental agency, such as a housing authority, the class
might be composed of all the tenants, and the housing authority would be bound to obey
the decision as it related to each tenant. While an individual action would not have the
same res judicata effect as the class action, it would probably, as a practical matter,
achieve the same result. The housing authority, if acting in good faith, could be expected
to follow the dictates of the decision in dealing with all similarly situated tenants, even
though not bound by court order to do so.
As mentioned earlier, the Zahn decision construed a jurisdictional statute, not a rule of
procedure. Therefore, the foregoing discussion is irrelevant to determining the applicabil-
ity of the Zahn requirement to Rule 23(b) (2) class actions. It does, however, demon-
strate the problems that can arise when the "separate and distinct" test is used.
58. See note 30 supra.
59. As the advisory committee which drafted the present Rule 23 pointed out,
"[i]llustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged with
discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are incapable of
specific enumeration. . . . [S]ubdivision (b) (2), [however,] is not limited to civil-rights
cases." 39 F.R.D. at 102.
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action does not avoid the effect of Zahn."° Courts must continue to
consider the particular class action and determine whether it presents
"separate and distinot" claims or "common and undivided interests."
Other provisions of -the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will also be
affected by Zahn. While claims asserted under some of the joinder
provisions may be considered ancillary to the federally-cognizable claim
and therefore need no independent basis for establishing federal juris-
diction,6' claims asserted pursuant to other joinder provisions, such as
permissive counterclaims,62 joinder of parties, 3 and permissive interven-
tion,64 must establish independent grounds for federal jurisdiction. In
these circumstances Zahn requires that each claim satisfy the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement independently. This requirement yields the
following results: (1) Multiple plaintiffs joining "separate and distinct"
claims under Rule 18 must each present a claim in excess of $10,000;
(2) A defendant asserting a "separate and distinct" permissive coun-
terclaim under Rule 13(g) must allege an amount in controversy in
excess of $10,000, although the defendant should be able to aggregate
all claims against a single plaintiff to reach the jurisdictional amount;
and (3) A party wishing to intervene permissively pursuant to Rule
24(b) must have a claim in excess of $10,000 if the claim is "separate
and distinct."
60. See, e.g., Portero Hill Community Action Comm. v. Housing Authority, 410
F.2d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1969); Mattingly v. Elias, 325 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (E.D. Pa.
1971), affd, 482 F.2d 526 (3rd Cir. 1973); Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson,
323 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (N.D. Ala.), rev'd on other grounds, 448 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.
1971).
61. For a listing of joinder provisions that employ ancillary jurisdiction, see text
accompanying notes 71-75 infra.
62. See Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 714-15
(5th Cir. 1970); Chance v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 332 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir.
1964). See also cases cited 6 WhrGrr & MmLER 1411 n.26. There is a limited exception
to this rule. If a permissive counterclaim is in the nature of a set-off and is used only to
reduce plaintiffs judgment, independent jurisdictional grounds are not required. Fraser v.
Astra S.S. Corp., 18 F.R.D. 240, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1955); see Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction
and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 31-34 (1964) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Fraser].
63. See Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Wsuorr 305. But see
cases cited notes 88 & 89 infra. Implicit in the decisions denying aggregation of multiple
plaintiffs' claims is a rejection of ancillary jurisdiction for joinder of parties. See cases
cited note 8 supra.
64. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 540 (8th Cir. 1970);
Hunt Tool Co. v. Moore, Inc., 212 F.2d 658, 688 (5th Cir. 1954). Contra, Northeast
Clackamas County Elec. Co-op v. Continental Cas. Co., 221 F.2d 329, 331-33 (9th Cir.
1954).
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V. EFFECT OF Zahn ON ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
Federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction,6 5 require a jurisdic-
tional basis to hear a claim. Generally, federal jurisdiction is established
by statutory grants.60 In certain circumstances, however, federal courts
will hear claims for which subject matter jurisdiction has not been pro-
vided by Congress. In these circumstances, the federal courts have
jurisdiction of the claim under the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine. 7
Simply stated, the doctrine provides that when a federal court has
statutory subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, that court also has
jurisdiction over certain matters incidental to the federally-cognizable
claim, even though those matters, if brought independently, would not
satisfy the statutory requirements for federal jurisdiction. The difficulty
with the doctrine lies not in defining it, but rather in determining the
circumstances in which ancillary jurisdiction is available. The Zahn
majority's virtually sub silentio rejection of ancillary jurisdiction in the
circumstances of that case did not simplify the problem.
Initially, ancillary jurisdiction extended only to those claims whose
adjudication was necessary for the federal court to achieve complete
adjudication of the federal claims presented. Thus, application of the
doctrine was limited to cases in which the nonfederal controversy had a
65. The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the Constitution to include:
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Au-
thority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;--between
Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
66. Article III has been interpreted not to be a self-executing grant of jurisdiction.
Rather, the authority given to Congress in section 1 of article III, "to ordain and
establish" lower federal courts, has been construed as establishing Congress's power to
grant or withhold jurisdiction from the lower courts as it desires. Thus, if Congress has
not made a statutory grant of jurisdiction, the federal courts have no jurisdiction. See
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226
(1922); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
67. For a general discussion of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine, see WRII-T § 9;
Fraser.
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direct relationship to property under the control of the federal court,08
or to proceedings to effectuate and protect federal judgments or de-
crees.
0 9
In 1926, the Supreme Court held in Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange70 that a federal court had jurisdiction to decide a counterclaim
which independently failed to satisfy the requisites for federal jurisdic-
tion even though the federally-cognizable claim had previously been
dismissed. This decision expanded ancillary jurisdiction to include mat-
ters of procedural convenience in addition to matters of necessity. While
the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the question of ancillary
jurisdiction and its application to various provisions of the federal rules,
lower federal courts have extended ancillary jurisdiction to compulsory
counterclaims under Rule 13(a),71 cross-claims under Rule 13(g), 72
impleader of third-party defendants under Rule 14,'7 interpleader un-
der Rule 22, and intervention as a matter of right under Rule
24(a).7r5  As Professor Wright has stated, "If there is any single ration-
alizing principle that will explain these diverse rules, it is not easily dis-
cerned."7 6
Against this background the Supreme Court's implicit rejection of
ancillary jurisdiction in Zahn assumes major significance. While argu-
ably the Zahn result should be applied to provisions of the federal rules
other than Rule 23 (b) (3), the Court's silence on the issue makes diffi-
68. E.g., Fulton Nat'1 Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925); Phelps v. Oaks,
117 U.S. 236, 240-41 (1886); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885); Freeman v.
Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450, 457 (1860); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. R.R.,
229 F.2d 584, 586 (10th Cir. 1956).
69. E.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239 (1934); Supreme Tribe of Ben
Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921); Jones v. National Bank of Commerce, 157
F.2d 214, 215 (8th Cir. 1946); see Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036
(2d Cir. 1972) (Timbers, J., dissenting).
70. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
71. See cases cited 6 WmGrr & MILLER 1414 n.55.
72. See R.M. Smythe & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 291 F.2d 721, 724 (2d Cir. 1961);
Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798, 805 (5th Cir. 1957). See also 6 WRIGHT & MILLER §
1433.
73. See Stemler v. Burke, 344 F.2d 393, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1965); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1962). See also 6 WIGrrr &
MILLER §§ 1444, 1445 n.14.
74. See Walmac & Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 111 (Ist Cir. 1955).
75. See Black v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 326 F.2d 603, 604 (10th Cir. 1964);
Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
945 (1963); cf. WRIGHT 331.
76. WRIGHT 21.
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cult the task of determining the extent to which ancillary jurisdiction
will still support claims brought under various joinder provisions of the
federal rules. Two conclusions may immediately be rejected: (1) ancil-
lary jurisdiction extends to any claim assertable under the federal rules
provided an initial federally-cognizable claim exists; and (2) ancillary
jurisdiction is available only when necessary to protect or effectuate a
federal court's disposition of a federal claim. Zahn rejected the former,
and Moore, the latter. The scope of ancillary jurisdiction falls somewhere
between the two standards.
Determining the effect of Zahn requires evaluation of the procedural
relationship between the potentially ancillary claim and the initial feder-
ally-cognizable claim.77 To assess this relationship, three criteria should
be considered: (1) whether the claim sought to be added would require
joinder of parties in addition to joinder of claims; (2) whether the
potentially ancillary claim is in the nature of an "original" or "discre-
tionary" claim rather than a "dependent" claim; 78 and (3) whether the
jurisdictional defect of the additional claim is lack of diversity, lack of
a federal question, or lack of jurisdictional amount. 79
77. This is not to conclude that the substantive relationship between the federally-
cognizable claim and the nonfederal claim is irrelevant to determining the availability of
ancillary jurisdiction. The substantive relationships must be considered to ascertain which
particular joinder provision, if any, is applicable. Once it is established that a specific
provision is proper, it is unnecessary to reconsider the substantive relationship of the two
claims to determine if ancillary jurisdiction is also appropriate, because the limits of
ancillary jurisdiction may be ascertained by examining the substantive relationship
criteria listed in the federal rules for determining the applicability of the joinder
provisions.
Several recent cases have noted Zahn's effect of limiting the scope of ancillary
jurisdiction. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., Civil Nos. 75-7031, -7038, -7055, -7057
(2d Cir. April 28, 1975) at 3174-76; Warren G. Kleban Eng'r Corp. v. Caldwell, 490
F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1974); United Pac. Reliance Ins. Cos. v. City of Lewiston, 372
F. Supp. 700, 704 (D. Idaho 1974). See also Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the
Jurisdictional Amount Requirement, 50 No=an DAMm Lw. 346 (1974).
78. The terms "discretionary" and "dependent" have no special significance in
themselves. They are used herein to serve as labels for the classifications defined and
discussed in the text accompanying notes 96-106 infra.
79. It should be noted that this criterion does not consider the procedural relation-
ship between the federal and nonfederal claim. Rather, it looks solely to the jurisdictional
defect of the nonfederal claim. The federal claim, however, is influential in the
evaluation of this category. If the federal claim arose under federal question jurisdiction,
then the nonfederal claim will be considered to have a jurisdictional defect of a lack of a
federal question, even though the claim may also lack diversity. An analogous result
would follow if the federal claim arose under diversity jurisdiction.
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A. Joinder of Claims v. Joinder of Parties
The implicit rejection of ancillary jurisdiction in Zahn involved addi-
tional claims of additional parties. If the Court made any reference to
ancillary jurisdiction, it was in the statement "one plaintiff may not
ride in on another's coattails."80 While this quotation provides little
guidance, it does indicate a hesitancy to extend ancillary jurisdiction to
claims whose adjudication would bring additional parties before the
federal courts. Thus, Zahn can be read as limiting the scope of ancillary
jurisdiction when joinder of parties is required, but not necessarily when
additional claims are joined.
It may not be of great practical significance to conclude that the juris-
dictional bar imposed by Zahn applies only to joinder of parties and
not to joinder of claims. While ancillary jurisdiction has not been ex-
tended to include multiple claims exerted by a single plaintiff under
Rule 18,81 this extension is unnecessary since a plaintiff may aggregate
all claims brought against a single defendant.8 2 Consequently, such
claims, although individually lacking the requisite jurisdictional amount,
may still be heard by a federal court. Claims that lack a federal ques-
tion may be heard under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine by a federal
court, at its discretion, provided the nonfederal claim arose out of -the
"common nucleus of operative facts" of a federally-cognizable claim. 8
Ancillary jurisdiction has also been allowed" for subsequent claims
that require an existing federal claim as a prerequisite to their assertion
under the federal rules.8 5 In light of this joinder of claims-joinder of
parties distinction, Zahn should not be considered precedent for re-
versal of the prior law of joinder of claims.
The Zahn court's reluctance to permit additional parties to use an-
cillary jurisdiction is not new.8 6 Traditionally, ancillary jurisdiction
did not extend to claims that necessitated joinder of additional parties
under Rule 20.87 In the past few years, however, some federal courts
80. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973), quoting 469 F.2d
1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 1972).
81. WIorr 343.
82. See cases cited note 52 supra.
83. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
84. For joinder provisions for which ancillary jurisdiction has been permitted, see
cases and sources cited notes 71-75 supra.
85. Subsequent claims are those claims that may only be asserted under the federal
rules by attachment to an existing claim.
86. Fraser 45.
87. See Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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have heard claims that involved less than $10,000 and that required the
joinder of additional parties, provided each additional party's claim was
joined with a federally-cognizable claim. Cases have permitted joinder
of either additional plaintiffs"8 or additional defendants.89
Logically, the Zahn decision should have reversed this trend. Yet
there are indications that the Zahn restriction of ancillary jurisdiction
will not be followed for joinder of parties under Rule 20.9o The decision,
however, construed a jurisdiction statute, not a rule of procedure. No
rationale is readily apparent that would distinguish Rule 20 from Rule
23 for purposes of applying the standard that a party asserting a "sepa-
rate and distinct" claim must independently satisfy the jurisdictional re-
quirements. 9'
88. See Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Wilson v.
American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966); Lucas v. Seagrave Corp.,
277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967); Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 276 F. Supp. 96
(D. Minn. 1967) (alternate holding); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa.
1966); Wiggs v. Tullahoma, 261 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); cf. Borror v. Sharon
Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964) (second plaintiff was nondiverse); Raybould v.
Mancini-Fattore Co., 186 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960) (single plaintiff was suing in
dual capacity, for himself and as administrator for wife's estate). But see, Hymer v.
Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969); Ciaramitaro v. Woods, 324 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D.
Mich. 1971). See generally Note, The Federal Jurisdictional Amount and Rule 20
Joinder of Parties: Aggregation of Claims, 53 MINN. L. REV. 94 (1968).
89. See F. C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.
1970); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp.,
392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968). But see Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.2d 11
(Sth Cir. 1961).
90. In Moor v. County Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), decided prior to Zahn, the
Supreme Court indicated some support for the trend in the lower courts to exercise
jurisdiction over additional, nonfederally cognizable claims involving joinder of parties.
The Court, however, refused to decide this question. It found that jurisdiction had been
asserted under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine and that the district court had properly
exercised its discretion not to hear the nonfederal claim. Id. at 716-17. For a discussion
of pendent jurisdiction, see note 91 infra. Two district court cases decided subsequent to
Zahn have disagreed on whether Moor or Zahn controlled. One court held it had
jurisdiction to hear a claim against a pendent defendant, distinguishing Zahn as having
involved class actions and pendent plaintiffs. Princess Cruises Corp. v. Bayly, Mar-
tin & Fay, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 762, 765 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The second case found
that Moor had avoided the question of jurisdiction and that Zahn controlled:
A reading and rereading of Zahn and its forebears leads this court to the con-
clusion that no district court discretion is involved in this particular context.
It is simply a "power" or jurisdiction situation and there can be no pendent
or ancillary jurisdiction. Perhaps this is making too much out of silence
[in the Zahn opinion], but the conclusion seems logical and compelling.
United Pac. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Lewiston, 372 F. Supp. 700, 704 (D. Idaho 1974); see
Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974) (dictum recognized that Zahn applies to Rule 20).
91. In addition to Moor, several of the opinions cited in notes 88 and 89 supra reliedWashington University Open Scholarship
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There are several situations, other than those involving Rule 20, in
which ancillary jurisdiction has been extended to claims requiring addi-
tional parties. New parties may be brought in by means of compulsory
counterclaims, 92 crossclaims, 93 and third-party claims94 without the
statutory jurisdictional requirements being independently satisfied. Addi-
tionally, a party who intervenes as a matter of right may do so without
establishing independent federal jurisdiction.95 Whether Zahn will re-
verse the law in these circumstances cannot be determined solely by con-
sidering the joinder of parties-joinder of claims distinction. Rather, it is
necessary to consider the second criterion previously mentioned: whether
the claim is a "discretionary" or "dependent" claim.
B. "Discretionary" Claims v. "Dependent" Claims
The joinder provisions of the federal rules may be divided into two
on pendent jurisdiction to provide jurisdiction over the nonfederal claim if the claim was
sufficiently factually related to the federal claim with which it was joined. Pendent
jurisdiction differs from ancillary in that it is exercised in the discretion of the trial judge
and its applicability is limited to those claims having the necessary factual relationship.
The availability of ancillary jurisdiction is more likely to be limited by the procedural
relationship between the two claims. See note 78 supra.
Some difficulty exists in concluding that pendent jurisdiction permits a federal court to
hear a nonfederal claim requiring joinder of parties. First, the principal case defining
pendent jurisdiction, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), did not
involve joinder of parties, but rather joinder of claims. See Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136,
137 (9th Cir. 1969). Second, the facts of the Zahn case would have permitted the use of
pendent jurisdiction if it had been available. The damages of all the class members were
caused by a single wrong, the alleged pollution of the lake. Thus, all the claims arose out
of a "common nucleus of operative facts," yet federal jurisdiction was not extended to
plaintiffs with claims of less than $10,000. While pendent jurisdiction may seem an
attractive device to balance the strictures that federal jurisdictional requirements place on
the joinder provisions of the federal rules, its use to join additional parties is questionable
in light of Zahn.
92. See, e.g., H. L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1967);
United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prod., 221 F.2d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 1955); Fraser
34-36.
93. See WRIaHT 353, Fraser 38.
94. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse Co., 302 F.2d 843, 845 (3d
Cir. 1962); Smith v. Whitmore, 270 F.2d 741, 745 (3d Cir. 1959); Dery v. Wyer, 265
F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1959); 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, 1444; Note, Rule 14 Claims and
Ancillary Jurisdiction, 57 VA. L. Rnv. 265 (1971). Authorities disagree whether a claim
by a third-party defendant against an original plaintiff arising out of the same
transaction or occurrence is covered by ancillary jurisdiction. Some cases have held that
a claim by an original plaintiff against a third-party defendant must independently satisfy
the jurisdictional requirements. See Fraser 38-43.
95. See cases and source cited note 75 supra.
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classes, distinguished by whether they deal with "discretionary" or "de-
pendent" claims. This classification, although not established by the fed-
eral rules or readily apparent on their face, becomes evident upon ex-
amination of the rationale underlying each of the various procedural
provisions and the legal consequences that flow from their use.
The "discretionary" class is composed of those provisions that pro-
vide a procedure for the assertion of "original" claims. A claim is
"original" if failure to assert the claim in the existing litigation would
cause no burden or prejudice to either plaintiff or defendant other than
increased legal expenses necessitated by multiple litigations. The claim
may be asserted at the discretion of plaintiff, either by an original
plaintiff against an additional defendant, or by an additional plaintiff
against an original defendant. This classification includes permissive
joinder of claims,90 permissive counterclaims, 97 permissive interven-
tion,9s and class actions.99
The "dependent" class is composed of those procedural provisions
whose use is dependent upon an existing federal claim. If the plaintiff,
defendant, or a third party to the federal claim would suffer prejudice
96. Rule 18, which governs joinder of claims, presents no substantive requirements:
"A party . . . may join, either as independent or as alternate claims, as many claims,
legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing party." FED. R. CIV. P.
18(a). Rule 18 permits, but does not require, joinder of claims. See Ross v. T. C. Bateson
Const. Co., 270 F.2d 796, 799-800 (5th Cir. 1959); Velsicol Corp. v. Hyman, 103 F.
Supp. 363, 367 (D. Colo. 1952). If plaintiff fails to join a claim, he is not barred from
later asserting that claim in a separate action in state court.
97. A defendant may assert ". . . as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing
party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claims." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b). If the defendant fails to assert a
counterclaim under Rule 13(b) he is not barred from presenting it in a subsequent action
in state or federal court. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661,
671 (1944); Fowler v. Sponge Prod. Corp., 246 F.2d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1957).
98. Permissive intervention is allowed at the court's discretion, " . . . when an
applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). "Permissive intervention may be allowed where the
intervenor has an economic interest in the outcome of the suit, although not a direct or
legal interest." Wauiorr 330. If a party has a direct or legal interest such that,
"disposition of that action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest," FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a), intervention becomes a matter or right.
99. Rule 23(c)(3) provides that the judgment of a class action, except a (b)(3)
action, shall extend to all persons "whom the court finds to be members of the class." In
a Rule 23(b)(3) action, individuals may choose to "opt out" of the class, and the
judgment will not apply to them. Class members in (b) (1) and (b) (2) class actions may
not "opt out."
467
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if not allowed to attach another claim to the existing litigation, the claim
is "dependent."'100 The potential prejudice need not be certain; all that
is necessary is the possibility that if this claim is not joined, the party
seeking to exert it may be put at a disadvantage.' 0 ' Included in this
class are compulsory counterclaims,0 2 crossclaims, 08 intervention as
a matter of right,-0 4 and third-party claims.'0 5
100. The prejudice considered here is prejudice resulting from a legal effect, not from
practical effects. If a party is not permitted to assert a claim initially, and later is barred
from asserting that claim, he has suffered legal prejudice. On the other hand, if a party
who is not permitted to assert his claim initially may sue later, but is then unable to
satisfy his judgment due to the defendant's lack of funds, that party has suffered practical
prejudice.
101. To consider whether prejudice would occur, it is desirable to look to the joinder
provision employed rather than the specific claim asserted. Otherwise, the decision could
turn on the merits of the claim rather than the possibility of prejudice.
102. A compulsory counterclaim is one that
. . . arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
FED. R. Cr.. P. 13(a). A party who fails to assert a compulsory counterclaim is barred
from bringing a later action on the claim. E.g., Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 127 (4th
Cir. 1969); Mesker Bros. Iron Co. v. Donata Corp., 401 F.2d 275, 279 (4th Cir. 1968);
see 6 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1417. If a party were to be legally prevented from asserting a
compulsory counterclaim, then he would never be able to recover on that claim, and
prejudice would result.
103. A cross-claim may be asserted
. . . by one party against a co-party out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter either of the original transaction or of a counterclaim
therein or relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original
action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g). A cross-claim is discretionary, and failure to assert it will not bar
subsequent litigation. American Sur. Co. v. Fazel, 20 F.R.D. 110, 111 (D. Iowa 1956).
However, preventing a party from asserting a cross-claim may prejudice him. "A cross-
claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable
to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-
claimant." FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g). If the cross-claimant is not permitted to present a
cross-claim, he may incur a debt resulting from an adverse judgment on the claim
asserted against him. Even though the cross-claimant could eventually recover from the
party against whom the cross-claim would have been filed, the potential cross-claimant
would still owe that debt for some period of time.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) permits intervention as a matter of right
.. . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transac-
tion which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest ...
Thus, it is obvious that denying the intervenor the opportunity to enter the litigation
would prejudice him.
105. A third-party claim may be made by the defendant (or plaintiff upon a
counterclaim) against " . . a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable
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Given this division of the joinder provisions of the federal rules, a
general rule of ancillary jurisdiction may be hypothesized: Ancillary
jurisdiction is available for "dependent" claims, but not for "discretion-
ary" claims. Fully stated, the hypothesis is: Given a particular joinder
provision, if the refusal to hear a claim asserted under that provision
would cause legal prejudice to the party seeking to exert the claim, an-
cillary jurisdiction is allowed. If no legal prejudice would be suffered,
ancillary jurisdiction is not available.
No contention is made that the above rule accurately represents the
existing case law."0 6 The hypothesis, however, is compatible with the
Zahn result. The excluded plaintiffs in Zahn were not prejudiced by their
expulsion from the litigation. Their opportunity to sue and to recover
damages in state court remained, undiminished by their exclusion. Al-
though in certain circumstances the denial of class action status will, as
a practical matter, prevent certain class members from recovering dam-
ages because legal expenses would exceed potential recovery, that preju-
dice results from the legal system itself, not from the specific litigation
of the action from which they were excluded.
Thus, Zahn should not be considered authority barring ancillary
jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party
claims, and intervention as a matter of right. Zahn may be considered
authority barring ancillary jurisdiction over claims asserted under join-
der provisions belonging to the "discretionary" class. Such claims, how-
ever, were generally not granted ancillary jurisdiction prior to the Zahn
decision.
C. Jurisdictional Defect
Apparently the jurisdictional defect of the excluded class members'
claims in Zahn was the lack of jurisdictional amount. °7 If the purposes
of ancillary jurisdiction are to prevent prejudice to the parties and to
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim [or defendant's counterclaim] against him."
FED. R. Civ. P. 14. The prejudice suffered by the denial of a third-party claim is the
same as that suffered as a result of a denied cross-claim. See note 103 supra.
106. As stated earlier, ancillary jurisdiction is difficult to explain in simple conceptual
terms. There are many cases decided by lower federal courts on an issue-by-issue basis,
but the Supreme Court has never provided a complete conceptual elucidation of ancillary
jurisdiction, and there is no indication that an explanation will be forthcoming.
107. Some of the class members also may have been nondiverse. However, unnamed,
nondiverse class members do not destroy the diversity between the class and the adverse
parties, see notes 110 and 111 infra and accompanying text.
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promote judicial economy, 08 the particular jurisdictional defect of the
potentially ancillary claim should not affect the grant of ancillary juris-
diction. If particular jurisdictional defects are, however, distinguished
for purposes of barring ancillary jurisdiction, it might be expected that
lack of a federal question or lack of diversity would be of greater conse-
quence than the lack of jurisdictional amount since the first two require-
ments have constitutional origins.10 9 While Zahn may appear to under-
cut this expectation, a distinction among jurisdictional defects may be
seen by comparing that case with Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cau-
ble.1 0 In Ben Hur, the Supreme Court held that, in a class action based
on diversity jurisdiction, unnamed nondiverse class members could be
included in the class. A comparison of Zahn and Ben Hur clearly indi-
cates that, while unnamed class members failing to satisfy the diversity
requirement can have their claims heard, class members falling to satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirement will be excluded. Assuming that
Ben Hur was not overruled by implication by Zahn, the only explana-
tion for this discrepancy is that the availability of ancillary jurisdiction
hinges on the particular defect of the jurisdictionally deficient claim."'
There are limited situations in which this difference based on juris-
dictional defect may have an effect. Compulsory counterclaims, cross-
claims, and intervention as a matter of right are readily granted ancillary
jurisdiction, making the jurisdictional defect distinction irrelevant."'
The only procedure other than class actions likely to be affected by this
108. See sources cited note 67 supra.
109. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
110. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
111. It is noteworthy that all of the named class members in Zahn had claims in
excess of $10,000, which nullifies any argument that the Zahn-Ben Hur distinction can
be explained by a standard that determines federal jurisdiction by looking only to the
parties actually before the court.
The anomaly that results from a comparison of Zahn and Ben Hur raises the question
whether Ben Hur is still good law. While the policies that influenced the Court in Zahn
might have been furthered by reversing Ben Hur, it is improper to conclude that Zahn
overruled Ben Hur sub silentio. First, the Ben Hur rule is long established. This strong
precedent should not be considered overruled unless the Supreme Court expressly does
so. Second, the Court in Snyder relied in part on the Ben Hur rule in reaching its
decision. The majority accepted the Ben Hur rule, and found that
[to allow aggregation of claims where only one member of the entire class
is of diverse citizenship could transfer into the federal courts numerous local
controversies involving exclusive questions of state law.
394 U.S. at 340. The Court then concluded that this result would run counter to the
purpose expressed by Congress when it raised the jurisdictional amount.
112. See notes 92-95 supra.
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distinction is the permissive joinder of parties. Thus, applying the Zahn-
Ben Hur distinction, Rule 20 claims by nondiverse additional plaintiffs
or against nondiverse additional defendants will be heard in federal
court, while Rule 20 claims for less than $10,000 will have to be heard
in state court.
The Zahn-Ben Hur dichotomy provides no guidance about how non-
federal claims requiring joinder of parties, but lacking a federal ques-
tion should be treated. The "pendent" jurisdiction doctrine, however,
may demand a result analogous to the Zahn-Ben Hur distinction.11 If
the federally-cognizable claim arose under federal question jurisdiction
and the additional claim did not, a federal court may be willing to hear
the claim as "pendent," even though the nonfederal claim requires join-
der of additional parties. On the other hand, if the jurisdictional defect
of the nonfederal claim is lack of jurisdictional amount, a federal court
may refuse to hear the claim by asserting that the "pendent" jurisdiction
doctrine is limited to claims arising under state law that are joined with
claims arising under federal law. While this distinction may seem un-
desirable, it is no more undesirable than the Zahn-Ben Hur distinction.
D. Conclusion
The implicit rejection of ancillary jurisdiction in Zahn will be influ-
ential in defining the contours of the ancillary jurisdiction concept.
Zahn did not present a major reversal of the law, but rather created a
deterrent to future expansion of ancillary jurisdiction. The Zahn result
tends to reinforce the law of ancillary jurisdiction. The effect of Zahn,
however, will be limited. Only in certain circumstances will it hinder
the extension of jurisdiction: where the additional claim necessitates
joinder of parties, where the additional claim is in the nature of an
original or "discretionary" claim, and, possibly, only where the juris-
dictional defect is lack of jurisdictional amount.
VI. REMOVAL JUISDICTION
The Zahn decision will require many plaintiffs in Zahn-type class
actions to resort to state courts if they intend to maintain their class
action."1 Once these actions are filed in state courts, defendants may
113. There is one difference, however, in that pendent jurisdiction is exercised in the
discretion of the trial court. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In the
Ben Hur-type case, if diversity exists on the face of the complaint, the trial court has no
discretion to exclude unnamed class members who are nondiverse.
114. Plaintiffs may have a problem in going into state courts. Not all states provide a
Vol. 1975:447]
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desire to remove the action to federal court. It is difficult to determine
the circumstances in which defendants will be permitted to do so. Zahn
will have some effect on the law concerning removal, but, more signifi-
cantly, the decision created a new difficulty with removal jurisdiction.
Removal from state court to federal court is permitted by section
1441 of Title 28.11 Subsection (a) provides for the removal of any
action over which the federal court could have had original jurisdic-
tion."16 If a "separate and independent" claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if presented alone, is joined with a nonremovable
claim, the entire action may be removed under subsection (C).117 For
class actions in which some, but not all, of the class members meet the
jurisdictional amount requirement, removal is possible only under sub-
section (c). The Zahn holding, that the entire class does not acquire
federal jurisdiction, would prevent removal under section 1441(a).118
procedure for class actions. Additionally, many states have class action procedures that
differ significantly from the federal rules. Generally, the different procedures either
follow the Field Code or old Rule 23. Once plaintiffs are dismissed from federal court,
they may be unable to bring the same kind of action in state court. For a thorough
discussion of class-action procedures in state courts, see Homburger, State Class Actions
and the FederalRule, 71 CoLUM. L. REV. 609 (1971).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970):
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United Stateg
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to
the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970):
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise
non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and
the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
118. A defendant in Zahn-type class actions could contend that removal under §
1441(a) is proper by reasoning: First, since original jurisdiction was sought by plaintiffs
in Zahn and Snyder, the Court applied only the plaintiff-viewpoint rule (plaintiff's
allegation of damages determines whether the jurisdictional amount requirement is
satisfied). Those plaintiffs who failed to satisfy the requirement acquired no federal
jurisdiction. Second, the correct rule in determining the amount in controversy for
removal jurisdiction is not the plaintiff-viewpoint rule. Attention should instead be
focused on the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction. See WIoHT § 34. To
ascertain removal jurisdiction, the court should determine the amount in controversy
from the defendant's viewpoint. Third, the defendant in a Zahn-type class action would
be facing claims for more than $10,000 and therefore the jurisdictional amount require-
ment would be satisfied.
The above argument ignores one important fact. The plaintiff-viewpoint rule is
employed only in cases in which "the benefit to plaintiff will have a different value than
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The issue presented is whether the claim of one class member is "sepa-
rate and independent" from other claims of the class. If not, the class
action would not meet the requirements for removal under subsection
(c), and the action would have to remain in state court.
Defining "separate and independent claim or cause of action!' is no
simple task. The leading Supreme Court case, American Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Finn,"9 held:
[W]here there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought,
arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate
and independent claim or cause of action under § 1441(c). 120
Finn involved an action by a single plaintiff against several defendants
who were liable only in the alternative. Any Zahn-type class action
would involve multiple plaintiffs seeking independent recoveries and
thus would be factually distinguishable from Finn. As two leading
commentators have stated,
Where, because of a common question of law or fact, several plaintiffs
join in one action to sue a defendant on their various individual claims,
these claims are separate and independent within the meaning of section
1441(c).121
Some cases have followed the above approach, 122 but contrary case
law 2 3 and commentary 124 exist. The argument against permitting re-
the loss to defendant if the relief is granted," such as suits for an injunction or to abate a
nuisance. WRiGHT 117. When multiple causes of action are presented, the traditional
rules of aggregation apply, and the defendant is not allowed to aggregate the amounts in
controversy for multiple plaintiffs in order to reach the jurisdictional amount required for
removal. See Title Guar. & Sur. Co. v. Allen, 240 U.S. 136, 140 (1916); Robbins v.
Western Auto. Ins. Co., 4 F.2d 249 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 698 (1925). The
Zahn decision made it clear that, for jurisdictional purposes, some class actions involve
individual causes of action. Because Zahn limited aggregation when original jurisdiction
was sought, the decision is strong authority for the proposition that aggregation will be
limited when removal jurisdiction is sought.
119. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
120. Id. at 14.
121. Moore & Van Dercreek, Multi-party, Multi-claim Removal Problem: The
Separate and Independent Claim Under Section 1441(c), 46 IowA L. REV. 489, 494-95
(1961).
122. See Alexander v. Lash, 311 F. Supp. 524 (D. Hawaii 1970); Biechele v. Norfolk
& W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Herrmann v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 308
F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Orn v. Universal Auto. Ass'n, 198 F. Supp. 377 (E.D.
Wis. 1961).
123. See Jett v. Zink, 362 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966);
Fugard v. Thierry, 265 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. IIl. 1967).
124. See 1 BARRON & HOLZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDTRE, 491-92 (Wright
ed. 1960).
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moval under section 1441(c) is that the "independent" claim or cause
of action requirement mandates that there not be a close factual rela-
tionship between the removable and nonremovable claims-that if the
same issues of law and fact are involved in both claims, the claims are
not independent. Were this approach to be followed, removal of any
class actions under section 1441 (c) would be impossible, because one
requirement for class actions is the existence of common questions of
law and fact.125
The preceding discussion has treated the class action as if it were
simply a joinder device that authorized multiple plaintiffs to join their
claims in a single litigation. Class actions are more than mere joinder
provisions, however, and this fact could represent another hurdle for
the defendant who attempts to remove to federal court. The problem
the defendant may face is whether the plaintiffs, by asserting their
claims as a class action, have changed the cause of action so that claims
that would be "separate and independent" if brought under a joinder of
claims provision no longer may be viewed as "separate." Plaintiffs oppos-
ing removal could argue that a class action represents only a single
cause of action providing for multiple recoveries.
The logic behind Zahn and Snyder, however, may provide support
for the removing defendant. Both cases considered the claims of the
individual class members, rather than the claim of the entire class, to
determine federal jurisdiction. Had the Court in either case done other-
wise, results opposite to those obtained would be expected. Thus, there
appears firm authority for the proposition that the use of a class action
procedure does not change the nature of the cause of action, at least
for the purpose of determining federal jurisdiction.
An additional problem arises if class actions are removed to federal
court. Several states' procedures for class actions differ from the federal
rules; in some states the procedure is analogous to old Rule 23.120 Upon
removal, class actions brought in state court as "spurious" class actions
would be governed by the federal rules.2 7 Thus, by means of removal,
the judgement effect of a "spurious" class action would be expanded. 128
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (2). See note 12 supra.
126. See Homburger, supra note 114, at n.94.
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c): 'These rules apply to civil actions removed to the United
States District Courts from the state courts and govern procedure after removal."
128. Few defendants would desire to expand the judgment effect of an action against
themselves. The real problem is whether it is proper to burden the defendant by
expanding the judgment effect of the litigation if the defendant exercises his option to
remove from state to federal court.
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https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/6
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
This result is incompatible with the concept that a federal court's juris-
diction upon removal is derived from the state court's jurisdiction.' 21
Admittedly, after removal, the federal judge has the discretion to remand
any claims that are not independently federally-cognizable and thereby
prevent this result. 130 Since the remanding is discretionary, however,
the potential for removal petition to bring, in effect, additional claims
into the litigation still exists.
A second problem emanates from the federal judge's discretion to
remand. If the federal judge were to remand the claims that failed to
satisfy the requirements for original federal jurisdiction, it would then
be possible for removal to cause part of the class action to be severed.
If the claims remanded were those of unnamed class members, then
there would be no participating plaintiffs left to continue the litigation in
the state court. The remanding would become, in reality, a dismissal of
the remanded claims.
The Zahn decision has created difficulties for federal judges facing
petitioners who seek to remove class actions from state to federal court.
Whether removal of Zahn-type class actions is permissible under section
1441 (c) is, at present, an unanswered question. Even if it is determined
that removal is proper, trial judges may face unpleasant decisions when
exercising their discretion to remand nonfederal claims. In certain cir-
cumstances, failure to remand will place an additional burden on defend-
ant. In other circumstances, remanding will mean, in effect, the dismis-
sal of some of the class members' claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Note has focused upon the legal rather than the practical effects
of the Zahn decision on federal jurisdiction. Readily apparent is the
conclusion that Zahn will be influential in a wide variety of circum-
stances, extending beyond Rule 23(b) (3) class actions brought under
diversity jurisdiction. What is also apparent is that Zahn placed a freeze
on federal jurisdiction. The decision reaffirmed the prevailing law, and
access to federal courts remains as it was prior to Zahn.
This Note has not considered the desirability of the Zahn result. To
do so would require evaluation of competing policy considerations, in-
129. If the state court did not have jurisdiction, the federal court cannot have
jurisdiction upon removal. See Venner v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 127, 131
(1926); Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
130. See text quoted note 117 supra.
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cluding the heavy workload of the federal courts and the need to litigate
certain claims in federal courts. In light of the complicated conceptuali-
zation of the law of federal jurisdiction and the similarity of language
between the jurisdictional statutes, any changes in federal jurisdiction
will have wide repercussions and deserve serious analysis.
Perhaps the time has come to reject heavy reliance on the existing
concepts and legal tests in the law of federal jurisdiction. If the Congress
feels compelled to reverse the Zahn result, it may best be advised to do
so by empowering the persons who have to deal with the problems of
federal jurisdiction, the federal judiciary, to make the decisions for
themselves. This could be done by granting the federal district courts
discretionary jurisdiction to hear claims that would be rejected under
the Zahn requirement. To this end, a proposed amendment to sections
1331 and 1332 is presented:
(c) The district court, may in its discretion, in the interests of judi-
cial efficiency131 and fairness to litigants,18 2 acquire original jurisdiction
of a claim or cause of action wherein the matter in controversy does not
exceed the sum or value of $10,000, but otherwise satisfies the require-
ments of this statute, provided that claim or cause of action is properly
joined under the rules of procedure 33 presefitly in force for the United
States district courts to a claim or cause of action that satisfies sub-
division (a) of this statute.13 4
131. Logic dictates that the courts should consider overall judicial efficiency, includ-
ing the effect upon the state courts. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
132. The phrase "fairness to litigants" is included so that trial judges will be required
to consider the potential unfairness to the party against whom the additional claims are
asserted. While it does not seem to be unfair to require a party to defend, in federal
court, against an additional claim which could later be brought in state court, in some
situations the additional claims could so complicate the litigation or so burden the
defendant that the federal court would be justified in exercising its discretion and
declining to hear the case.
133. This requirement does not change the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into
grants of federal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction would be granted by the proposed statutory
amendment; the federal rules would do no more than define the procedural circumstances
in which the jurisdictional grant could be employed. The requirement, "property joined
under the rules of procedure," should be viewed as a condition precedent to the exercise
of the jurisdictional grant.
134. The approach employed in this proposed amendment is also suitable if the
jurisdictional defect is lack of jurisdictional amount. If the defect were lack of diversity
or lack of federal question, analogous statutes would be unsatisfactory because constitu-
tional limitations would arise. It appears necessary that there be an additional require-
ment that the nonfederal claim arise out of "the common nucleus of operative fact" of a
federally cognizable claim. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
The result, however, would be merely a statutory recognition of the pendent jurisdiction
concept.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/6
